Use Of Blood Tests As Evidence Of Intoxication
In Virginia by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 2 Article 25
Fall 9-1-1961
Use Of Blood Tests As Evidence Of Intoxication In
Virginia
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Use Of Blood Tests As Evidence Of Intoxication In Virginia, 18 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 370 (1961),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol18/iss2/25
370 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
Virginia is generally in accord with the rules followed in the
majority of states in regard to the procedural aspects of proving the
defense of insanity.41 Bringing up the issue of insanity under a plea
of not guilty is the prevailing rule followed by thirty-eight states.
42
However, the Model Penal Code calls for a "special plea,"43 the
rationale being that there should be a full disclosure of all pertinent
issues at an early stage of the proceedings. This would be a consider-
able aid for a more scientific determination of mental irresponsibility
since the Commonwealth would have longer to investigate the mat-
ter. While this comment does not purport to resolve the substantive
inconsistencies of insanity, its repetitious use as a defense in the field
of criminal law manifestly demands some clarification of the substan-
tive tests. It would be advisable to have a more authoritative declara-
tion as to the different tests to be applied at the time of the crime
44
and at the time of the trial.4 5 Attorneys are well aware of the distinc-
tion, but with the use of commissions and assignments to mental hos-
pitals for observation, a more explicit pronouncement would be a
further aid to the medical profession. Except for these suggestions,
the Virginia procedure appears to be highly equitable to all con-
cerned.
WILIAM W. MOOsx
USE OF BLOOD TESTS AS EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION
IN VIRGINIA
The chemical analysis of blood samples to determine intoxication
has reached a stage of scientific development and reliability where-
by it now serves a most useful purpose in assisting courts and juries
whenever intoxication is in issue.' In the absence of specific legis-
reveals no cases on insanity. For a brief history of the writ see 37 Harv. L. Rev.
744 (1924). The writ has been used in cases of insanity in other jurisdictions. See
Schroers v. People, 399 Ill. 428, 78 N.E.2d 219 (1948); Swain v. State, 215 Ind. 259,
18 N.E.2d 921 (x939), cert. denied, 3o6 US. 66o (1939).
"See generally Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 353-474 (1954).
8 Ala. L. Rev. 49, 52-55 (1955) has an excellent short summary of the procedural
rules throughout the United States.
"Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 357 (1954).
"Model Penal Code § 4.03(2) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). See Weihofen, Proce-
dure for Determining Defendant's Mental Condition Under the American Law In-
stitute's Model Penal Code, 29 Temp. L.Q. 235 (1956).
"See notes 28 and 29 supra and accompanying text.
"s3ee notes 24 and 25 supra and accompanying text.
'Ladd & Gibson, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood Tests to Determine Intoxica-
tion, 9 Va. L. Rev. 749, 75o (1943); Comment, 35 Texas L. Rev. 813, 8x5-16 (1957).
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lation the courts treat the admissibility of blood tests according to
established rules relating to scientific evidence.2 Virginia has given
its stamp of legislative approval to the admissibility in evidence of
blood tests,3 but the Supreme Court of Appeals has, by judicial in-
terpretation of the relevant Code sections, limited the use of the tests
to prosecutions for driving while under the influence of intoxicants
It is desirable that the scope of this legislation be enlarged to permit
the introduction of blood test analyses into evidence in other types
of criminal prosecutions and in civil suits where intoxication is in
issue.
Chemical tests to determine intoxication are used in nearly all
states.5 Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have legis-
lation dealing specifically with the subject,6 and the remaining states
use such tests without legislative authority.7 States having legislation
in this area have adopted in varying degrees the provisions of sec-
tion 11-902 of the Uniform Vehicle Code which sets forth standard
presumptions to be drawn from given blood alcohol percentages.8
The use of these tests in state courts was upheld over constitutional
objections by the United States Supreme Court in Breithaupt v.
Abrain.9
Virginia enacted chemical test legislation in 1954.10 Prior to that
time the results of blood and breath tests were admissible in evidence"
in prosecutions under Code section 18-7512 for driving while intoxi-
cated. The 1954 legislation allowed the use of blood tests at the re-
2Donigan, Chemical Tests and the Law 13 (1957).
Wa. Code Ann. § 18.1-55-57 (Repl. Vol. 196o) .
"Wade v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, ii6 S.E.2d 99 (196o); Russell v. Ham
mond, 200 Va. 6oo, ioS S.E.2d 626 (1959)-
'According to Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 n.3 (1957), forty-seven
states used chemical tests to determine intoxication at that time.
'Committee on Alcohol and Drugs of the National Safety Council, Uses of
Chemical Tests for Intoxication 1 (1959): A summary of such statutes is set forth in
the appendix to this comment.
'See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957) which lists states where
there is statutory or judicial authority for the use of chemical tests to determine
intoxication.
'Those states which have adopted statutes have patterned their legislation
after § 11-9o of the Uniform Vehicle Code (1956), cited in Goff, Constitutionality
of Compulsory Chemical Tests to Determine Intoxication, 49 J. Crim. L., C & PS. 58
n4 (1958).
p352 U.S. 432 (1957). See especially footnote 3 at page 436.
'Acts of the Assembly 1954, ch. 406. This was codified as Va. Code Ann. §
18-75.1 (Supp. 1954) which has subsequently been extensively altered. See note 16
infra.
11Omohundro v. Arlington County, 194 Va. 773, 75 S.E.2d 496 (1953)-
'Code § 18-75 is now § 18.1-54 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
372 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
quest of the accused and provided that a failure to request such
a test was not a proper subject for comment at the trial. This nullified
a 1954 decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals that the testimony of
a police officer that the accused refused to submit to a blood test did
not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.13 In
the 1955 decision of Rogers v. Commonwealth,14 the result of a blood
test was offered by the Commonwealth without adequate evidence re-
garding the details of the handling of the blood sample. The Supreme
Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence was insufficient to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the blood was that of the defendant
and reversed the drunk driving conviction. It was held that the Com-
monwealth must prove with competent evidence the taking of the
blood sample, every step in its transmission, and the testing of the same
sample by a qualified analyst.
Apparently prompted by a desire to modify the rule of the Rogers
case'5 the Virginia Legislature determined that further statutory pro-
visions for chemical tests were in order. In 1956 an addition to the
Code was enacted setting forth the procedures to be followed in
making blood tests and the presumptions to be drawn from the re-
sults.16 The statute provides for placing the blood sample in a sealed
container provided by the Chief Medical Examiner, delivering it to
the arresting officer and mailing the sample to the Chief Medical
Examiner for analysis. The report of the analysis can then be in-
troduced in evidence without the elaborate proof required under the
rule of Rogers v. Commonwealth. The statute also states the various
presumptions arising from given percentages of alcohol in the blood.17
uGardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 81 S.E.2d 614 (1954).
"197 Va. 527, 90 S.E.2d 257 (1955).
uIbid.
1'Acts of the Assembly 1956, ch. 557; Acts of the Assembly, Extra Session 1956,
ch. 45; both codified as Va. Code Ann. § 18-75.1-75.3 (Supp. 1956) (now codified as
Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-55-57 (Repl. Vol. ig6o)).
27Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-57 (Repl. Vol. 196o). "In any prosecution for a violation
of § 18.1-54, or any similar ordinance of any county, city or town, the amount of
alcohol in the blood of the accused at the time of the alleged offense as indicated
by a chemical analysis of the accused's blood in accordance with the provisions of
§ 18.1-55, shall give rise to the following presumptions:
"(i) If there was at that time o.o5 per cent or less by weight of alcohol in
the accused's blood, it shall be presumed that the accused was not under the in-
fluence of alcoholic intoxicants;
"(2) If there was at that time in excess of o.o5 per cent but less than o.15 per
cent by weight of'alcohol in the accused's blood, such facts shall not give rise to
any presumption that the accused was or was not under the influence of alcoholic
intoxicants, but such facts may be considered with other competent evidence in
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused;
"(3) If there was at that time 0.15 per cent or more by weight of alcohol in the
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This legislation has provided law enforcement agencies in the
state with a reliable tool of evidence in prosecuting for violations of
section 18-54. According to a report of the National Safety Council for
1959, of 3,291 prosecutions in Virginia for driving while intoxicated
in which chemical tests were made, there were 2,677 convictions.' 8
If these tests are acceptable as evidence in criminal prosecutions
for driving while intoxicated, why should there be any objection
to their admission in evidence in other criminal prosecutions or in
civil proceedings where intoxication is an issue?
The Supreme Court of Appeals closed the door to the use of a blood
test certificate of the Chief Medical Examiner in a civil action in the
case of Russell v. Hammond'9 in which the plaintiff brought an action
as administratrix to recover damages for the death of her son who was
struck by the defendant's automobile. At the time of the accident a
police officer informed the defendant that he could request a blood
test. The plaintiff attempted to submit the results of the test in evi-
dence, and the trial court excluded the certificate. The Supreme
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the lower court and held that
under the applicable statutes the certificate is not admissible in a
civil case. This holding was reaffirmed in the case of Brooks v. Huf-
ham.2
0
Since the statutory presumptions of intoxication have proven
useful in prosecutions for driving while intoxicated, it would seem that
they might also be applied in other criminal prosecutions where
intoxication is in issue. This point was raised in the recent case of
Wade v. Commonwealth,21 a prosecution for manslaughter arising
out of an automobile accident in which an occupant of the Wade
vehicle was killed. There was evidence that Wade had been drinking,
that he consented to the blood test, that the blood sample was taken
according to the procedure outlined in the statute, and that such
sample was analyzed by the Chief Medical Examiner. At the trial
the prosecutor commented in his opening statement to the jury,
over the objection of the defendant, on the certificate of the Chief
Medical Examiner. Over the objection of the defendant the attorney
for the Commonwealth was also permitted to introduce the certifi-
cate in evidence.
accused's blood, it shall be presumed that the accused was under the influence of
alcoholic intoxicants."
'"Committee on Alcohol and Drugs of the National Safety Council, Uses of
Chemical Tests for Intoxication 14 (1959).
1 2oo Va. 6oo, 1o6 S.E.2d 626 (1959).
'P2oo Va. 488, io6 S.E.2d 631 (1959)-
2'ao Va. 117, t16 S.E.2d 99 (i96o).
i96i]
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On appeal the major issue of the case was whether the blood test
iesult was admissible in a manslaughter prosecution. 22 The defen-
dant contended that the certificate of analysis referred to in section
18-75.1 could be introduced only in a prosecution under section
18-75 relating to driving while intoxicated.2 3 The Commonwealth, on
the other hand, took the position that the certificate was properly
admitted because section 18-75.-2 provided that the certificate "shall ...
be admissible in any court or proceeding as evidence of the facts there-
in stated and the result of the analysis of the blood of the accused." 24
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding
that the result of the blood test is not admissible in a prosecution
for manslaughter. The decision was apparently based upon a strict
construction of the language of the statute which does not expressly
provide for use of the tests and statutory presumptions in prosecutions
other than for driving while intoxicated. The court referred to the
decision in Russell v. Hammond2 5 which held that the certificate
was not admissible in a civil case. The court there pointed out that
the three statutes (sections 18-75.1 through 18-75.3, now 18.1-55
through 18.1-57) "must be read together since they are related and the
last two refer to the blood alcohol test made under section 18-75.1"26
Thus, in Wade the court concluded that these statutes all relate to
a prosecution under section 18-75:
"Sections 18-75.1, 18-75.2, and 18-75.3 refer to § 18-75 (driving
automobile, etc., while intoxicated) or similar ordinance of
any county, city or town. W¥ade was not prosecuted for
operating an automobile under the influence of intoxicants,
and we cannot extend the provisions of the statutes in ques-
tion to include prosecutions for involuntary manslaughter or
other criminal offenses." 27
This language, coupled with that of the Russell case, prohibits
"This issue has been dealt with in other jurisdictions. Arizona and Nebraska
have enacted into law the statutory presumptions which arise on submission in
evidence of blood test results in order to supplement their drunk driving statutes.
Courts of these states have ruled that the statutory presumptions do not apply
when the defendant is charged with an offense other than driving while intoxicated.
Hoffman v. State, i6o Neb. 375, 7o N.W.2d 314 (1955). Mattingly v. Eisenberg, 79
Ariz. 135, 285 P.2d 174 (1955). South Dakota, however, has ruled that the presump-
tions may be used in criminal prosecutions. Fossum v. Zurn, ioo N.W.2d 8o5 , 81
(S.D. 196o).
23*202 Va. 117, 121, 116 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1960).
"Va. Code Ann. § 18-75.2 (Supp. 1956) (now Va. Code Ann. § 181-56 (Repl.
Vol. i96o)).
"2oo Va. 6oo, io6 S.E.2d 626 (1959).
"Id. at 6o3, 1o6 S.E.2d at 629.
'Wade v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, 122, 116 SE.2d 99, 103 (1960).
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the introduction in evidence of the certificate of the Chief Medical
Examiner in any cases other than prosecutions for violation of sec-
tion 18-75 (now 18.1-54). the effect of these rulings is to exclude
a reliable and competent source of evidence from the courts.
It should be noted that besides section 18.1-54 there are eight
separate and distinct offenses set forth in the Code involving acts
done "while under the influence" of intoxicants, or "being intoxi-
cated." Since the issue of intoxication is as material 28 to these of-
fenses as it is to section 18.1-54, blood tests should be applicable in
prosecutions for these offenses. Section 4-26 provides that it shall be
a misdemeanor to sell any alcoholic beverages to "an intoxicated
person." 29 Section 5-1o.i makes it a misdemeanor for any person
to operate an aircraft "while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor...3.30 Section 15-553 authorizes the governing bodies of cities,
towns and counties to enact ordinances prohibiting drivers of motor
vehicles, engines and trains in such towns "while under the influence
of alcohol," and to prescribe fines and other punishment for violation
of such ordinances.3 1 Section 18.1-237 provides that if any person who
has "arrived at the age of discretion... get or be drunk in public
he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.... "32 Section 18.1-239
makes it unlawful for any person "being intoxicated" to disturb an
assembly met for religious worship.3 3 Section 18.1-24o makes it a mis-
demeanor for any person, being intoxicated, to "disturb the exercise
of any free school or any other school or of any literary society....,,4
Section 45-72(c) states, "No person shall at any time ... enter any
mine while under the influence of intoxicants.13a Section 54-560 pro-
vides for suspension of pilots who are "intoxicated... while in charge
of a vessel ... ". ,3 6 In the above listed offenses the issue of intoxication
-"ln the court room the terms relevancy and materiality are often used inter-
changeably, but materiality in its more precise meaning looks to the relation be-
tween the propositions for which evidence is offered and the issues in the case. If
the evidence is offered to prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue ...
the evidence is properly said to be immaterial." McCormick, Evidence § 152 (1954).
"When evidence is referred to as immaterial, it is usually meant that it is being
offered to prove some proposition which makes no difference under the rules of
%ubstantive law, or has not been put in issue by the pleadings." Laughlin, Evidence,
Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 44 Va. L. Rev. 1195, 1197 (1958).
-Va. Code Ann. § 4-62 (1950).
3'Va. Code Ann. § 5-101 (195o).
-"Va. Code Ann. § 15-553 (Repl. Vol. 1956).
Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-237 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
:'Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-239 (Repl. Vol. sg6o) .
'"Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-240 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
: Va. Code Ann. § 45-72(c) (Repl. Vol. 1958).
WVa. Code Ann. § 54-560 (Repl. Vol. 1958).
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is as material as it is in a prosecution under 18.1-54, and therefore the
use of blood tests in establishing the matter of intoxication should
be allowed.
There are other criminal and civil cases such as manslaughter
prosecutions and negligence actions arising out of automobile ac-
cidents in which evidence of intoxication is relevant. Liability in
such eases is predicated upon negligence, not upon intoxication;
however, intoxication is evidence of negligence.
3 7
It is submitted that if blood tests are acceptable as proof of
intoxication in criminal prosecutions under section 18.1-54, they should
also be relevant evidence in other criminal and civil cases where
intoxication is in issue. Five states have legislation that provides for
use of chemical tests in such cases;ss five jurisdictions have legislation
providing for use of the results of chemical tests in criminal prosecu-
tions other than driving while intoxicated;3 9 and a number of juris-
dictions without specific statutory provisions permit the use of chem-
ical test results in criminal *cases other than driving while intoxi-
cated prosecutions and in civil actions.4 0 To facilitate the use of this
evidence, which has substantial probative value whenever intoxication
is in issue, it is urged that the Virginia statute be revised to make
the test results admissible in evidence in other criminal prosecutions
as well as in civil litigation.
JOHN PAUL
m In the case of Bogstad v. Hope, 199 Va. 453, 1oo S.E.2d 745 (1957) the plaintiff
sought to show that the defendant was intoxicated when his car struck and injured
the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Appeals commented: "Here the evidence sup-
ports an instruction submitting the issue of whether or not the defendant was
operating his automobile while under the influence of intoxicants.... [The
instruction] should have been so phrased as to tell the jury that operating the
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants was negligence, and if Bogstad's
negligence in that respect was a proximate cause of the accident and that the
plaintiff was free from contributory negligence, then they should find for the
plaintiff. In short, if the defendant was driving his car while under the influence
of intoxicants, he violated § 18-75, Code 195o, and that was negligence. Yet it was
not his intoxication but his negligence that had to be the proximate cause of the
mishap before there could be a finding against him because of his conduct in that
respect." Id. at 458-59, too S.E.2d at 748-49.
3Delaware, Illinois, New York, North Dakota and Wisconsin. See appendix.
3District of Columbia, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota and Nevada. See appendix.
'0Lawrence v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. App. 2d 206, 127 P.-2d 931 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1942) (civil suit); People v. Henry, 23 Cal. App. 2d 155, 72 P.2d 915 (Dist.
Ct. of App. 1937) (motor vehicle homicide); Touchton v. State, 154 Fla. 547, 18
So. 2d 752 (1944) (motor vehicle homicide); Nicholson v. City of Des Moines,
246 Iowa 318, 67 N.W.2d 533 (1954) (civil suit); Commonwealth v. Capalbo, 3o8
Mass. 376, 32 N.E.2d 225 (1941) (murder); Breithaupt v. Abram, 58 N.M. 385, 271
P.2d 827 (1954), atfd, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (involuntary manslaughter); State v.
Cash, 219 N.C. 818, 15 S.E.2d 277 (1941) (murder); Bowden v. State, 95 Okla. Crim.
382, 246 P.2d 427 1952) (motor vehicle homicide).
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APPENDIX
Table of Statutory Provisions for the Use of Chemical Tests
To Determine Intoxication
Driving ivhile Other Criminal All Actions





District of Columbiaa x
Georgia 8  x
Hawaii 7  x
Idaho8  x
Illinois9  x
Indiana' 0  x
Kansas"L x#  x
Kentucky12  x
Maine1 3  x
Maryland 4  x
Michigan 5  x
Minnesota' 6  x
Montana 7  x
Nebraska 8  x
*Applicable also to local ordinance violations of driving while intoxicated.
'Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-692 (Supp. 196o).
2Ark. Stat. § 75-1031-1 (Supp. 1957).
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4-30 (Stpp. 1957).
'Del. Code Ann. tit. I', § 3507 (Supp. 196o).
D.C. Code Ann. § 40-6o9a (Supp. ig6o).
"Ga. Code Ann. § 68-z625 (z957).
-Hawaii Rev. Laws § 311-29 (95,5).
81daho Code Anti. § 49-352 (1957).
"Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 95 1/a § x44 (Smith-Hurd 1958).
10 1nd. Ann. Stat. § 47-2003 (Supp. 1960).
"Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-1001-07 (Supp. 1959).
'-Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18g.52o (1955)-
'"Me. Rev. Stat. Anti. ch. 22, § 15o (Supp. 1959).
"Md. Ann. Code art. 35. § 1o (Supp. 1960).
"*Mich. Acts 196o, No. 148.
'"Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169.1t2 (196O).
1-Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 32-2t42(2 ) (Supp. 1959).
"Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-727.01 (1960).
i96i]
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Driving while Other Criminal All Actions




New York22  X**
North Dakota23  x
Oregon2 4  x
Rhode Island 25  x
South Carolina2 6  x
South Dakota27  x
Tennessee28  x
Utah2 9  X
Vermont 3o  x
Virginia
3 1  x*
Washington 32  x
West Virginia3 ! x
Wisconsin 34  x
WyomingS5 x
**Applicable to all actions if the person was arrested at the time the blood
sample was taken.
'DNev. Rev. Stat § 484.055 (ig6o).
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 262:20 (1955)-
"N.J. Rev. Stat. § 39:4-50.1 (Supp. 196 0 .
2N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic § 1194.
=N.D. Rev. Code § 39-20-07 (1960).
MOre. Rev. Stat. § 483.630 (1959).
2R.I. Gen. Laws-Ann. § 31-27-2 (Supp. 1960).
"S.C. Code § 46-344 (1952)-
rS.D. Code § 44.o302-1 (Supp. 1960).
"Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-1032-33 (1955)-
2Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (196o).
V1Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 1189 (Supp. 1959).
aVa. Code Ann. § 18.1-54-57 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
32Wash. Rev. Code § 46.56.010 (Supp. 1959).
3W. Va. Code Ann. § 1721(331a) (Supp. 196o).
3'Wis. Stat. Ann. § 325.235 (1958).
3Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 31-129 (1957)-
